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SUMMARY

WAITS v. FRITO-LAY, INC.: NINTH CIRCUIT
REAFFIRMS VIABILITY OF VOICE
MISAPPROPRIATION AS A CALIFORNIA
TORT
1. INTRODUCTION

In Waits v. Frito-Lay,t the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a celebrity's right to protect a distinctive voice from
commercial misappropriation and upheld the viability of voice
misappropriation as a tort in California. 2 The court upheld
awards of compensatory and punitive damages, and also affirmed that Waits had standing to sue the defendants for false
endorsement. S
II. FACTS
Tom Waits is a singer, actor, and songwriter who has taken
a strong philosophical stand against commercial endorsements
throughout his career. One of Waits' songs, "Step Right Up," is
an indictment of the hucksterism and commercialism that per1. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Boochever, J.; the
other panel members were Browning, J., and Reinhardt, J.).
2. [d. at 1100.
3. [d. at 1096.
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vade modern life. Ironically, "Step Right Up" was used as the
basis for a commercial advertising Frito-Lay's new product, SalsaRio Doritos, although both the advertising company, TracyLocke, and Frito-Lay were aware of Waits' long-standing disapproval of commercial endorsements. 4
To perform in the commercial, Tracy-Locke chose singer
Stephen Carter, who was able to closely mimic Waits' voice.1i Because of fears that the Carter version was too imitative of Waits,
Tracy-Locke also made an alternate version of the commercial
with another singer. s
Knowing that the Carter version of the radio commercial
could potentially expose them to liability, Tracy-Locke consulted legal counsel.' Tracy-Locke's counsel ventured an opinion
that only Waits' singing style, not his voice, was imitated in the
radio commercial, and that style is not something an artist can
claim as his or her own. 8 Relying on a narrow interpretation of
the recent decision in Midler v. Ford Motor CO.,9 the advertising
agency then recommended the Carter version and offered to indemnify Frito-Lay for any claims that might arise from using
the commercia1. 10 Frito-Lay decided to use the Carter version
for their advertising. 11
The radio commercial was broadcast in September and October, 1988, in 61 markets nationwide, including Los Angeles,
San Francisco, and Chicago. Waits heard the commercial in Los
Angeles. 12
In November, 1988, Waits sued Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke
in federal district court for voice misappropriation under California law and for false endorsement under the Lanham Act. 13
4. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cit. 1992).
5.Id.
6. Id. at 1098.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9. Midler, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
10. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13. Id. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, codified in U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., was passed
in 1946 to protect commercial parties from unfair competition.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/21

2

Judy: Torts

TORTS

1993]

341

The case was tried to a jury in April and May, 1990.14 The jury
found in Waits' favor, awarding him $375,000 in compensatory
damages and $2 million in punitive damages for voice misappropriation, and $100,000 in damages for violation of the Lanham
Act's prohibition on false representation. II! The trial court also
awarded Waits attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act. 16
On appeal, Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke challenged the
court's reliance on Midler, which recognized voice misappropriation as a tort in California. The defendants also challenged the
elements of voice misappropriation, the availability of certain
compensatory and punitive damages, and Waits' standing to sue
for false endorsement under the Lanham Act. 17
The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's findings, but vacated the award of damages under the Lanham Act because it
duplicated other compensatory damages. 18
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

V OICE

MISAPPROPRIATION

In Midler, the Ninth Circuit held that "when a distinctive
voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately
imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California. IIl9
The court explained that the Midler voice misappropriation tort
stems from a "violation of the right of publicity, the right of a
person whose identity has commercial value - most often a celebrity - to control the commercial use of that identity."20 Midler established that when a celebrity's voice is an integral part of
that person's identity, the "right of publicity" prohibits imitations of the voice for commercial purposes without the celeb14. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098.
15. Id. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), forbids false
representation.
16. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1098. Section 35 of the Lanham Act, as amended in 1988,
provides for attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
17. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096.
18.Id.
19. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
20. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1993).
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rity's consent.21
The jury determined that Waits has a distinctive and widely
known voice and found that the defendants had violated Waits'
right of publicity by broadcasting a commercial "which featured
a deliberate imitation of Waits' voice."22
1.

Continuing Viability of Midler Copyright Law

Preemption by Federal

The defendants raised three arguments concerning the voice
misappropriation claim. First, they argued that Midler was "impliedly overruled" by the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito
Boats, Inc. u. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 28 and was preempted
by the federal Copyright Act. 24 Second, the defendants claimed
that the court's jury instructions defining the elements of voice
misappropriation were improper. 211 Third, the defendants disputed both the compensatory and punitive damage awards.~6
The Ninth Circuit responded to the defendants' arguments
by emphasizing that Bonito did not create a broad rule that federal patent law always preempts state law. 27 Rather, the court
held that Bonito reaffirmed the right of states to "place limited
regulations on the use of unpatented designs in order to prevent
consumer confusion as to the source."28 The court pointed out
that the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized the authority
of states to protect the right of entertainers to control publicity
about themselves. 29
The Ninth Circuit affirmed its holding in Midler that copyright preemption does not apply to cases of voice misappropriation, because a voice cannot be the subject matter of copyright.30
21. [d.
22. [d. at 1098-99.
23. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(l) (1976).
25. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099.
26. [d.
27. [d.
28. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165.
29. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
433 U.S. 562 (1977)).
30. [d. at noD.
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The court reasoned that Waits' voice misappropriation claim
was based on an invasion of a personal property right: Waits'
right of publicity to control the public use of his identity as embodied in his voice. SI The elements of a voice misappropriation
claim (when the voice rather than style is imitated, and when
the voice is sufficiently distinctive and widely known) are different from elements of a copyright infringement case. S2 Therefore,
Waits' voice misappropriation claim was not preempted by federal copyright law. ss
0

2.

Jury Instructions

The lower court instructed the jury that voice misappropriation consists of the deliberate misappropriation for commercial
purposes of (1) a voice, that is (2) distinctive, and (3) widely
known. S4 The defendants argued that these instructions provided incorrect definitions of the three Midler tort elements. 311
a. "Voice" vs. "Style"
The defendants conceded that a celebrity's voice is protected by Midler, but argued that their SalsaRio Doritos radio
commercial copied Waits' style, not his voice. The defendants
proposed a jury instruction that defined style and stated that
style is not subject to ownership. The defendants argued further
that when the trial court refused the "style" instruction, the jury
was misled °into believing they could consider style as well as
voice. ss
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the voice misappropriation instructions and concluded that the jury was riot misled, as the
instructions limited the jury's consideration to voice. S7 The trial
judge did instruct the jury that style imitation alone is insufficient to establish liability.s8 Based on its holding in Midler, the
31. [d.

32.
33.
034.
35.
36.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100-01.
37. [d. at 1101.
38. [d.
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Ninth Circuit emphasized that the tort of voice misappropriation involves an imitation so realistic that "people who were familiar with plaintiff's voice who heard the commercial believed
plaintiff performed it."S9 This distinction adds an additional element to Midler's formulation of voice misappropriation: actual
confusion. 40
b. Definition of "Distinctive"
The defendants contended that the jury instruction on distinctiveness was unfair and inaccurate because it confused the
distinctiveness of a voice with its identifiability or recognizability.41 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that
the defendants' distinction had no basis in law. 42
c. Definition of "Widely Known"
The defendants also argued that Waits' voice was identifiable by only a small number of people, so it failed to meet the
"widely known" test of Midler. The' court responded to this argument by noting that the Midler protection was intended to
cover the voices of many popular singers who fall short of superstardom. Instead of allowing relief only to the most famous of
entertainers, the amount of damages sought in each case is a reflection of the extent of the singer's celebrity and injury.4s
3.

Compensatory Damage Award

The jury awarded Waits $100,000 for the fair market value
of his services, $200,000 for injury to his peace, happiness and
feelings, and $75,000 for injury to his goodwill, professional
standing and future publicity value. The defendants challenged
the latter two awards, contending that such damages are unavailable as a matter of law and that there was no evidentiary
support for the awards. 44
39. ld. (emphasis original).
40. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1101 n.3.
41. ld. at 1101.
42. ld. at 1102.
43.ld.
44. ld. at 1103.
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a. Injury to Peace, Happiness and Feelings
The Ninth Circuit noted that the "appropriation of a celebrity's identity can cause humiliation, embarrassment, and
mental distress."411 Therefore, damages in addition to compensation for economic injury are appropriate. 46 Mental distress damages are dependent upon the nature of the infringement and embarrassing impact on the singer.47 The court said the damages
the jury awarded for mental distress were supported by evidence
showing that Waits found the commercial use of his voice particularly offensive. 48 Waits testified that when he heard the commercial, he was shocked and very angry, and that these feelings
intensified when friends called and asked him to explain why he
did the commercia1. 49 The commercial humiliated Waits by
making him appear hypocritical to people who were aware of his
philosophical opposition to commercialism. CiO
b. Injury to Goodwill and Future Publicity Value
The court noted that misappropriation of identity can also
cause injury to commercial reputation. The jury found that the
SalsaRio Doritos advertisement created a public impression that
Waits was a hypocrite because his opposition to commercialism
was such a fundamental part of the character, personality and
image that he cultivated. Also, Waits' expert witness testified
that because of this commercial, it was likely that Waits would
command a lower fee if he chose to make endorsements in the
future. CiI
4. Punitive Damage Award

The jury awarded $2 million in punitive damages for voice
misappropriation, $1.5 million from Tracy-Locke and $500,000
45. Id. at 1103 (quoting Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d
821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974».
46. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103.
47.Id.
48.Id.
49.Id.
50.Id.
51. Id. at 1104.
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from Frito-Lay.1I2 In general, punitive damages are available in
cases where a defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice. liS
The Ninth Circuit upheld the punitive damages award,
pointing out that the decision in Midler provided notice to the
defendants that a professional singer has a right to control the
commercial use of a distinctive voice. The court noted that the
jury was presented with evidence showing that Frito-Lay and
Tracy-Locke knew that Waits was opposed to commercial endorsements. The defendants' legal counsel also alerted them
that potential liability could result from using such a close imitation of Waits' voice in their commercial. Tracy-:Locke was sufficiently aware of Midler to caution Frito-Lay about possible liability for misappropriation and offered to indemnify Frito-Lay.
Despite this, the defendants chose to air the Carter version of
the radio commercial.!!'
The jury concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with malice. The defendants
took a calculated risk, consciously disregarding the effect of their
actions on Waits' rights. III!
B.

LANHAM ACT CLAIM

The purpose of the Lanham Act is to prevent unfair competition, including false representations concerning association, endorsement, or false representation concerning the qualities of
goods or services. lie Section 43(a) of the Act prohibits the use of
false designations of origin, false descriptions, and false representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services. 1I7
Waits contended that by using the parody of his song and imitating his voice, the defendants misrepresented his association
52. [d.
53. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1992). The
court noted that malice is defined in the California Civil Code as a "willful and conscious
disregard of the rights" of others.
54. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1104-05.
55. Id. at 1105-06.
56. [d. at 1108.
57. Id. at 1106 (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1981»; see also
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
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with them and his endorsement of SalsaRio Doritos. 1I8
The jury found in Waits' favor and awarded him $100,000 in
damages, plus attorneys' fees as provided in section 35 of the
Lanham Act. 1I9 The defendants appealed, contending that Waits
lacked standing to sue under the Lanham Act, that his claim for
false endorsement failed on its merits, that the damage award
was duplicative, and that attorneys' fees were improper. 6o
1.

False Endorsement

Claims for false endorsement include claims by celebrities
for the unauthorized imitation of their distinctive attributes. 61
False endorsement based on unauthorized use of a celebrity's
identity is a form of false association that is likely to deceive
consumers.82 1988 amendments to s~ction 43(a) of the Lanham
Act clarify the legislative intent in banning the use of any symbol or device likely to deceive consumers as to the association,
sponsorship, or approval of goods or services by another person. 6S "Symbol or device" is interpreted to include distinctive
sounds and physical appearance. 64
2. Standing

The defendants challenged Waits' standing to sue under the
Lanham Act because he was not in direct competition with
them. 611 The Ninth Circuit noted that this argument, if followed,
would preclude claims by most endorsers who are commercially
damaged by a false endorsement, contrary to the intended protections of the Lanham Act. 66 The court said the "dispositive
question" in determining standing is whether the plaintiff "has a
reasonable interest to be protected against false advertis58. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1106.
59.Id.
60.Id.
61. Id.

62. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107.
63.Id.
64.Id.
65.Id.
66.Id.
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ing."S7The court recognized that like a trademark holder, an entertainer has a reasonable interest in protecting his work product. ss Standing is not limited to actual competition, but extends
to a purported endorser who has an economic interest akin to a
trademark in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or
her identity.ss The advertiser and endorser are both utilizing or
marketing that personal property, and it is likely that the
wrongful use of a professional singer's unique voice would injure
him commercially.70
3. Merits

Although the Doritos commercial did not say explicitly that
Waits endorsed the product, ordinary consumers could be confused. The jury listened to tapes of Waits' voice, tapes of the
radio commercial, and heard evidence of actual consumer confusion. 71 The court pointed out that in addition to the actual confusion, the jury found that the commercial was targeted to an
audience which overlapped Waits' audience72 (males between
the ages of 18 to 35 who listened to the radio). Therefore, the
court upheld the jury's finding of a Lanham Act violation. 73
4. Damages

The Ninth Circuit Court concluded (and Waits agreed) that
the $100,000 in damages awarded under the Lanham Act duplicated the award for Waits' voice misappropriation claim representing the fair market value of his services. For this reason, the
court allowed Waits to recover this amount in compensatory
damages only and vacated the award of damages under the Lanham Act. 7•
67. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108 (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir.
1981)) (additional citations omitted).
68. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108.
69. [d. at 1110.
70. [d.
71. [d. at 1111.
72. [d.
73. [d.
74. [d.
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5. Attorneys' Fees
Section 35 of the Lanham Act gives trial courts the discretion to award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in "exceptional cases."711 The court noted that attorney fees were appropriate here because there was enough evidence for the jury to
find that the defendants acted with malice, fraud or
oppression. 76
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit found that Waits' claims for voice misappropriation and violations of the Lanham Act were legally sufficient, and held that the trial court did not err in its jury instructions on the elements of voice misappropriation. 77 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the award of attorneys' fees, but reversed Waits'
Lanham Act award because it duplicated the voice misappropriation award. 78
In Waits, the Ninth Circuit strengthened the protections
granted in Midler by holding that a celebrity's distinctive voice
may not be misappropriated and used for false endorsements.
The fact that both Frito-Lay and Tracy-Locke were aware of
Waits' policy against commercial endorsements, the fact that
they chose a singer who could do a near-perfect imitation of
Waits' voice, and the fact that they were aware of possible civil
liability for their actions lead to the conclusion that the defendants took a risk and knowingly impugned Waits' integrity in the
public eye.
Cynthia M. Judy*

75. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988).
76. Waits, 978 F.2d at 111l.
77. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1993).
78.Id.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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